80,000 Hours for the Common Good: A Thomistic Appraisal of Effective Altruism by Miller, Ryan





80,000 Hours for the Common Good: A 
Thomistic Appraisal of Effective Altruism 
Abstract 
Effective Altruism is a rapidly growing and influential contemporary philosophical movement 
committed to updating utilitarianism in both theory and practice. The movement focuses on 
identifying urgent but neglected causes and inspiring supererogatory giving to meet the need. It 
also tries to build a broader coalition by adopting a more ecumenical approach to ethics which 
recognizes a wide range of values and moral constraints. These interesting developments 
distinguish Effective Altruism from the utilitarianism of the past in ways that invite cooperation 
and warrant a fresh look from Thomists. Nonetheless Effective Altruism’s fundamentally 
consequentialist and aggregative model for ethics precludes more foundational agreement with 
Thomistic ethics in ways that limit the extent of practical cooperation. 
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1. Introduction to Effective Altruism 
 The Effective Altruism movement is one of the most ambitious attempts by philosophers 
in recent years to use new developments in ethics to coordinate and integrate other disciplines. A 
roughly ten year old movement begun by a few Oxford philosophy graduate students now 
awards about 300 million dollars in grants annually1 and has resulted in serious reflections by 
doctors2 and technologists3 about how to be more ethical in their practice. The movement runs a 
website called 80,000 Hours which encourages those discerning a career to focus on how they 
can use their roughly eighty thousand lifetime working hours “to help solve the world’s most 
pressing problems” which it lists as global health and development, animal welfare, the long-
term future of humanity, and further philosophical research and communication in ethics.4 Their 
general advice to focus on both the direct ethical impact of a career and charitable giving has 
been heard by thousands, including some of the most talented people in the world.5  
 Effective Altruists’ encouragement to give 10-50% of income to charity6 should be 
appreciated by Thomists,7 since presently only 15% of U.S. Catholics donate at least ten percent 
                                                 
1 William MacAskill, “The Definition of Effective Altruism,” in Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, ed. Hilary 
Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
2 John Launer, “Is It Worth Being a Doctor? Effective Altruism and Career Choice,” Postgraduate Medical Journal 
96, no. 1141 (November 1, 2020): 723–24, https://doi.org/10.1136/postgradmedj-2020-138936. 
3 Alexander Herwix and Amir Haj-Bolouri, “Having a Positive Impact with Design Science Research – Learning from 
Effective Altruism,” in Designing for Digital Transformation. Co-Creating Services with Citizens and Industry, ed. 
Sara Hofmann, Oliver Müller, and Matti Rossi, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (International Conference on 
Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 
235–46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64823-7_22. 
4 “What’s the Best Charity to Donate To?,” 80,000 Hours, December 2019, https://80000hours.org/articles/best-
charity/. 
5 “2019 Annual Review” (80,000 Hours, April 5, 2020), https://80000hours.org/2020/04/annual-review-dec-2019/. 
6 Benjamin Todd, “Why and How to Earn to Give,” 80,000 Hours, April 2017, 
https://80000hours.org/articles/earning-to-give/. 
7 See Thomas Aquinas, “Secunda Secundae,” in Summa Theologiae, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso, 2016, 
https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC-part2-2.htm Q. 87. 





of their income.8 Further, any reader of recent papal encyclicals should welcome a commitment 
to global health and development,9 animal welfare,10 and the long-term future of humanity.11 
And what member of the American Catholic Philosophical Association could fail to be excited 
about money and talent for philosophical research and communications in the present era of 
academic budget cuts? Nonetheless while some Christians have appreciated the Effective 
Altruists’ call for aid to be preferentially directed to the neediest, no matter where they may be in 
the world,12 neither Thomists nor Catholics generally have written much about the movement. 
One reason for this lack of reaction might be a deep ambivalence in Thomists’ thoughts about 
Effective Altruism. On the one hand, the movement’s central exhortation toward greater 
charitable giving is at best commendable and at worst innocuous. On the other hand, Effective 
Altruism is often presented as a gussied up version of Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism.13 While 
                                                 
8 Brian Starks and Christian Smith, “Unleashing Catholic Generosity” (University of Notre Dame McGrath Institute 
for Church Life, Fall 2012), 
https://mcgrath.nd.edu/assets/96494/unleashing_catholic_generosity.pdf%22%3Eunleashing_catholic_generosity.
pdf. 
9 Francis, “Fratelli Tutti, on Fraternity and Social Friendship,” Encyclical, October 3, 2020, para. 109, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-
tutti.html. 
10 Francis, “Laudato Si’, on Care for Our Common Home,” Encyclical, May 24, 2015, para. 92, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-
laudato-si.html; this also holds for Aquinas at least as a matter of preventing vice: “Book Three,” in Summa Contra 
Gentiles, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 
https://isidore.co/aquinas/ContraGentiles3b.htm Chap. 112, n. 13. 
11 Francis, “Laudatio Si’,” May 24, 2015, para. 109. Aquinas, like the Effective Altruists, considers preserving the 
future in as good a state as the present a legitimate constraint on almsgiving: “ST IIa-IIae” Q. 32, art. 6, co. 
12 Alida Liberman, “Effective Altruism and Christianity: Possibilities for Productive Collaboration,” Essays in 
Philosophy 18, no. 1 (January 2017): 6–29, https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1576. 
13 See e.g. John Gray, “How & How Not to Be Good,” The New York Review of Books, May 21, 2015, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/05/21/how-and-how-not-to-be-good/; Catherine Tumber and Iason 
Gabriel, “The Logic of Effective Altruism,” Boston Review, July 1, 2015, https://bostonreview.net/forum/peter-
singer-logic-effective-altruism; Giles Fraser, “It’s Called Effective Altruism – but Is It Really the Best Way to Do 
Good?,” The Guardian, November 23, 2017, sec. Money, 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/belief/2017/nov/23/its-called-effective-altruism-but-is-it-really-the-best-
way-to-do-good. Singer was indeed the motivation for Effective Altruism: “Foreword,” in Effective Altruism: 
Philosophical Issues, ed. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), v–
vi. 





Catholics can appreciate Singer’s concern for the poor,14 the logical conclusion of his views in 
the infanticide of severely disabled infants is morally repugnant to anyone with even vaguely 
Thomist sensibilities.15 Moreover, utilitarianism was condemned as a moral philosophy detached 
from eternal law in the magisterium of both Pius XII16 and John Paul II.17 It is therefore 
understandable that Thomists may have decided to pass over such a morally ambiguous 
movement in silence.  
 I nonetheless suggest that the time for more sustained Thomist engagement with 
Effective Altruism has come. First, the movement’s influence is spreading and deepening 
throughout all fields of applied ethics and even international relations, so ignoring it is 
counterproductive. Second, treating the movement as merely a rebranding of already-rebutted 
utilitarian views ignores the major work Effective Altruists have done, beginning with William 
MacAskill’s doctoral dissertation,18 to respond to stock criticisms and expand their field of 
                                                 
14 E.g. Charles C. Camosy, Peter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization (Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
15 E.g. Derek S. Jeffreys, “Euthanasia and John Paul II’s Silent Language of Profound Sharing of Affection:’ Why 
Christians Should Care About Peter Singer,” Christian Bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality 7, no. 
3 (January 1, 2001): 359–78, https://doi.org/10.1076/chbi.7.3.359.6881; Peter J Colosi, “John Paul II and Christian 
Personalism vs. Peter Singer and Utilitarianism: Two Radically Opposed Conceptions of the Nature and Meaning of 
Suffering,” Ethics Education 15, no. 1 (2009): 23; John Finnis, “Capacity, Harm and Experience in the Life of Persons 
as Equals,” Journal of Medical Ethics 39, no. 5 (2013): 281–83; Robert P George, “Infanticide and Madness,” Journal 
of Medical Ethics 39, no. 5 (2013): 299–301; Charles C. Camosy, “Concern for Our Vulnerable Prenatal and 
Neonatal Children: A Brief Reply to Giubilini and Minerva,” Journal of Medical Ethics 39, no. 5 (2013): 296–98; John 
Paul II, “Evangelium Vitae, on the Value and Inviolability of Human Life,” Encyclical, March 25, 1995, para. 14, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-
vitae.html; Aquinas, “ST IIa-IIae” Q. 64, art. 6, co. 
16 “Summi Pontificatus, on the Union of Human Society,” Encyclical, October 20, 1939, para. 55, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_20101939_summi-
pontificatus.html. 
17 “Veritatis Splendor,” Encyclical, August 6, 1993, para. 74, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor.html. 
18 “Normative Uncertainty” (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, UK, University of Oxford, 2014). 





ethical regard. Indeed, Effective Altruists have begun making arguments that are pro-natal,19 
unabashedly pro-life,20 and even ascetical.21 A more nuanced appraisal is worthwhile. 
2. Axiological Criticisms and Responses 
 Every ethical theory must offer both an axiology (an account of the goods and evils 
which motivate action) and an action theory (an account of how particular actions relate to those 
goods and evils). This appraisal begins with axiology, since Thomists have sharply criticized 
utilitarians in this regard but Effective Altruism has made significant advances. 
2.1 The Hedonic Criticism 
 One response to utilitarianism, exemplified by the old Catholic Encyclopedia, is to treat it 
as “a modern form of the Hedonistic ethical theory which teaches that the end of human conduct 
is happiness” such that “the arguments urged against Hedonism in general are effective against 
Utilitarianism.”22 Unaugmented, this is a strange line of criticism for Thomists, since Aquinas 
professes that happiness is the last end of man because it is “a perfect good that puts the appetite 
totally to rest.”23 Perhaps the real objection is that utilitarians define happiness in a reductive way 
as net quantity of pleasure,24 whereas Aquinas holds that true happiness is found in God alone 
rather than in pleasure, which he takes to be a mere bodily delight.25 While this criticism finds its 
                                                 
19 Bernadette Young, “Parenthood and Effective Altruism,” Effective Altruism Forum (blog), April 14, 2014, 
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/bz2A2gRvtrpHAsToN/parenthood-and-effective-altruism. 
20 Dale, “Blind Spots: Compartmentalizing,” Effective Altruism Forum (blog), December 31, 2014, 
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ADuroAEX5mJMxY5sG/blind-spots-compartmentalizing. 
21 Kathryn Muyskens, “The Other Half of Effective Altruism: Selective Asceticism,” Essays in Philosophy 18, no. 1 
(April 1, 2017): 91–106, https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1575. 
22 James Fox, “Utilitarianism,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912), 
https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15241c.htm. 
23 Thomas Aquinas, “Prima Secundae,” in Summa Theologiae, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso, 2016, 
http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC-part1-2.htm Q. 2, art. 8, co. 
24 Jason Lloyd, “Let There Be Justice: A Thomistic Assessment of Utilitarianism and Libertarianism,” Texas Review of 
Law and Policy 229 (Fall 2003): 232. 
25 Aquinas, “ST Ia-IIae” Q. 2, art. 6, co. 





mark for Bentham, however, it fails to hold for Mill and Singer.26 Mill admits not only 
quantitative but also qualitative distinctions in happiness, and his “rule for measuring [quality] 
against quantity” is “the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of experience, to 
which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished 
with the means of comparison.”27 Singer, too, has defended this sort of preference-based 
utilitarianism.28 Aquinas’s argument against happiness consisting in bodily pleasure is based on 
just this sort of preference-ordering argument: bodily pleasure is finite and thus incapable of 
satisfying infinite human desire, while the infinite goodness of God can completely satisfy 
human desire without bodily pleasure.29  
 Jason Lloyd suggests that the relevant difference is utilitarians’ subjective conception of 
happiness grounded in the experiences of the majority versus Aquinas’s objective hierarchy of 
goods.30 What makes Aquinas’s hierarchy of goods objective, however, is not that it commands 
universal assent but that such ordering belongs to the wise man who is actually acquainted with 
(cognoscit) the highest good.31 Only such a person, possessed of wisdom as a gift of the Holy 
Spirit, would meet Mill’s criterion of being best furnished with the means of comparison. Indeed, 
more recent utilitarians like Allan Gibbard insist that the theory depends on some objective 
ordering of preferences.32 While Aquinas’s account of the qualitative hierarchy of human goods 
                                                 
26 Emilie Dardenne, “From Jeremy Bentham to Peter Singer,” Revue d’études Benthamiennes 7 (September 13, 
2010), https://doi.org/10.4000/etudes-benthamiennes.204. 
27 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. John M. Robson, Collected Works 
of John Stuart Mill 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 214. 
28 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 25. 
29 Aquinas, “ST Ia-IIae” Q. 2, art. 6, co. 
30 “Let There Be Justice: A Thomistic Assessment of Utilitarianism and Libertarianism,” 235, 241. 
31 Aquinas, “ST IIa-IIae” Q. 45, art. 1, co. 
32 Allan F. Gibbard, “Ordinal Utilitarianism,” in Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, ed. 
George R. Feiwel (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987), 135–53, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07357-3_3. 





certainly exceeds the bounds of Mill’s materialism and empiricism, these metaphysical and 
epistemic concerns are outside the scope of utilitarianism as an ethical theory.  
 Effective Altruism goes even further in partitioning the application of utilitarian 
reasoning from the metaphysical ground of utility. Far from a commitment to the deeply 
controverted claims associated with Bentham and Singer, MacAskill says that Effective Altruism 
does not essentially involve any first-order normative claims at all, and is even compatible with 
significant uncertainty about the correct axiology.33 Instead, MacAskill thinks that Effective 
Altruism requires only the commitments to effectiveness (doing as much good as possible with 
the resources available) and altruism (everyone’s good should count equally).34  
 Thomists should respect both of these commitments. Aquinas argues that almsgiving is a 
matter of precept due to its relation with charity—we are to be the well-doers of others and not 
merely their well-wishers—and that the precept applies to resources surplus to maintaining one’s 
own person and household.35 The first claim on this surplus is had by those whose needs are 
extreme and otherwise unmet,36 and Aquinas further specifies that it is not praiseworthy to give 
extravagantly to those whose needs are already met, because the same resources could be used to 
meet the basic needs of others.37 Having thus established effectiveness as a requirement, Aquinas 
                                                 
33 MacAskill, “Normative Uncertainty”; William MacAskill, “Normative Uncertainty as a Voting Problem,” Mind 125, 
no. 500 (October 1, 2016): 967–1004, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv169; William MacAskill and Toby Ord, 
“Why Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness?,” Noûs 54, no. 2 (2020): 327–53, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12264; William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord, Moral Uncertainty (Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). 
34 MacAskill, “The Definition of Effective Altruism,” 14. 
35 Aquinas, “ST IIa-IIae” Q. 32, art. 5, co. 
36 Ibid.. Effective Altruists disagree among themselves about the “otherwise unmet” criterion, see Mark Budolfson 
and Dean Spears, “The Hidden Zero Problem: Effective Altruism and Barriers to Marginal Impact,” in Effective 
Altruism: Philosophical Issues, ed. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2019); versus Andreas Morgensen, “The Callousness Objection,” in Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, ed. 
Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
37 Aquinas, “ST IIa-IIae” Q. 32, art. 10, co. 





also insists on altruism. Where almsgiving is a matter of precept it is not a matter of liberality,38 
and thus the recipients must be selected according to their circumstances rather than personal 
preference.39 While Aquinas grants that closeness to the giver of alms is a circumstance yielding 
a certain claim on care, he nonetheless insists that it be a lesser criterion than the extent of 
need.40 This is quite compatible with current framings of Effective Altruism since resources 
given to those closely conjoined to us might either be considered as simply unavailable for 
altruism41 or as a duty of group membership which preempts individualized duties.42 Far from 
being precluded by Thomistic axiology, the minimal heuristic principles of Effective Altruism 
thus seem to follow from Thomist commitments.43 
2.2 The Institutions Criticism 
 Another common criticism of Effective Altruism is the institutional critique, which 
“targets effective altruists’ tendency to focus on single actions and their proximate 
consequences” to “the neglect of coordinated sets of actions directed at changing social 
structures that reliably cause suffering.”44 The institutional critique arises directly from the 
commitment to effectiveness, which requires data—data that is much easier to obtain for projects 
of narrower scope and their proximate consequences than for broader and longer-term 
                                                 
38 C.f. ibid. Q.63, art. 1, ad 3. 
39 This is the sin Aquinas calls “regard for persons”: Ibid. Q. 63, art. 1, co. 
40 Ibid. Q. 32, art. 9, co. 
41 MacAskill, “The Definition of Effective Altruism,” 15–16. 
42 Stephanie Collins, “Beyond Individualism,” in Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, ed. Hilary Greaves and 
Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
43 As Mill himself supposed: “Utilitarianism,” 218. 
44 Alice Crary, “Letter to a Young Philosopher: Don’t Become an Effective Altruist” (Public Philosophy, Oxford 
University, June 11, 2020), https://www.oxfordpublicphilosophy.com/blog/letter-to-a-young-philosopher-dont-
become-an-effective-altruiststrong-strong. This criticism has been advanced by Angus Deaton, “The Logic of 
Effective Altruism,” Boston Review, July 1, 2015, https://bostonreview.net/forum/peter-singer-logic-effective-
altruism, Emily Clough, “Effective Altruism’s Political Blind Spot,” Boston Review, July 14, 2015, 
https://bostonreview.net/world/emily-clough-effective-altruism-ngos, and especially Timothy Syme, “Charity vs. 
Revolution: Effective Altruism and the Systemic Change Objection,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22, no. 1 
(February 1, 2019): 93–120, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-09979-5. 





undertakings. This concern about malformed social structures should resonate with Catholics due 
to its similarity to Pope John Paul II’s language of “structures of sin.”45 Such sinful institutions, 
moreover, are the macro-scale versions of an even more fundamental structure which reliably 
causes suffering, but can be improved by a coordinated set of actions—vicious character.46  
 The institutional critique certainly lands on Bentham’s purely act-based utilitarianism. In 
fact, Mill himself recognized the inadequacy of Bentham’s theory in this respect, and insisted on 
the moral importance of habits: 
When the moralist thus overlooks the relation of an act to a certain state of mind as its 
cause, and its connection through that common cause with large classes and groups of 
actions apparently very little resembling itself, his estimation even of the consequences of 
the very act itself, is rendered imperfect. For it may be affirmed with few exceptions, that 
any act whatever has a tendency to fix and perpetuate the state or character of mind in 
which itself has originated. And if that important element in the moral relations of the 
action be not taken into account by the moralist as a cause, neither probably will it be 
taken into account as a consequence.47 
Surely this is not a full-blown virtue ethics. Mill is a consequentialist, whose axiology reduces to 
the aggregate happiness present in a state of affairs, which character helps to cause and compose 
but does not constitute.48 Aquinas is also not a strict virtue-ethicist in his axiology, however, 
taking actions rather than character the central bearers of moral good and evil,49 and including all 
foreseen harms as aggravating factors in the evil ascribed to actions.50 While these axiological 
                                                 
45 John Paul II, “Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,” Encyclical, December 30, 1987, paras. 36–40, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-
socialis.html. 
46 See Aquinas, “ST Ia-IIae” Q. 71, art. 3 for a discussion of the relation between vice and sets of actions. The 
analogy with character should be taken seriously, since in the social sciences “institutions” means any “well-
established and structured pattern of behavior”: “Economic Institutions,” in The Library of Economics and Liberty 
(Liberty Fund, 2019), https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/economicinstitutions.html. 
47 John Stuart Mill, “Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy,” in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. John M. 
Robson, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 8. 
48 Mill, “Utilitarianism,” 213. 
49 Aquinas, “ST Ia-IIae” q. 71, arts. 3, 5. 
50 Ibid. Q. 73, art. 8, co. 





differences between Aquinas and Mill are subtle (because the terminology used and distinctions 
made differ so sharply), they are fundamental for any deep comparison of Thomistic and 
utilitarian ethics. For the purpose of shared public advocacy, however, these metaphysical 
differences need not take center stage—it’s sufficient to note that utilitarians are not insensitive 
to the importance of character formation in moral decision-making. 
 Effective Altruists have also taken the institutional criticism seriously and worked to 
internalize it. Certainly they were right to care about data, as anyone committed to effectiveness 
(like Aquinas) should. Different programs for preventing the effects of contagious disease in 
poor countries sometimes have thousand-fold differences in their cost-effectiveness,51 which our 
sin-darkened intellects52 often fail to recognize in the absence of data. Even knowledge of earthly 
sciences proportioned to our minds requires great care and perseverance,53 and God has directly 
revealed little about the relative effectiveness of various charitable endeavors. On the other hand, 
Effective Altruists have been committed from the start to some endeavors on which little data 
exists (like the preservation of the far future against hostile artificial intelligences) because of 
their large potential benefits.54 Effective Altruism’s attachment to empirical evidence is not due 
to misguided scientism but rather a concern that effectiveness will otherwise be dominated by 
                                                 
51 Toby Ord, “The Moral Imperative Toward Cost-Effectiveness in Global Health,” in Effective Altruism: 
Philosophical Issues, ed. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 
31. 
52 See the contrast between Thomas Aquinas, “Prima Pars,” in Summa Theologiae, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso, 2016, 
http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC-part1.htm Q. 94, art. 4, co., and “ST Ia-IIae” Q. 85, art. 3, 
co. 
53 Aquinas, “ST IIa-IIae” Q. 2, art. 4, co. 
54 Nick Beckstead, “A Brief Argument for the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future,” in Effective 
Altruism: Philosophical Issues, ed. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2019). 





emotional appeals55—a concern which Thomists should share since Aquinas identifies reason’s 
failure in the face of inordinate passion as the general internal cause of sin.56 Furthermore, 
Effective Altruists have recently been more explicit about taking a broader view of scientific 
methodology “to include reliance on careful rigorous argument and theoretical models as well as 
data,”57 and a broader view of data which includes “ways of gaining empirical evidence other 
than [Randomized Controlled Trials].”58 Effective Altruists have even come to realize that 
promoting a given form of altruism is a good way to gain data and improve institutions in a 
virtuous cycle59—an insight that should be familiar to an Aristotelian thinking about character 
development. These insights have spurred Effective Altruists to begin addressing both the 
improvement of individual character60 and political institutions.61 The institutional critique has 
been fully internalized by Effective Altruists. 
3. Action-Theoretic Criticisms and Responses 
 Thomists have historically criticized not only utilitarianism’s axiology but also its action 
theory. While Effective Altruists have tried to make their action theory open to more agent-
centric and non-consequentialist perspectives, less has been gained in this area than in axiology. 
                                                 
55 Iason Gabriel and Brian McElwee, “Effective Altruism, Global Poverty, and Systemic Change,” in Effective 
Altruism: Philosophical Issues, ed. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2019), 101. 
56 See “ST Ia-IIae” Q. 75, arts. 1-2 and Q. 77, art. 1. 
57 MacAskill, “The Definition of Effective Altruism,” 14. 
58 Ibid., 15. This even includes awareness of the external validity concerns about Randomized Controlled Trials: 
Amanda Askell, “Evidence Neutrality and the Moral Value of Information,” in Effective Altruism: Philosophical 
Issues, ed. Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 46n27. 
59 Askell, “Evidence Neutrality and the Moral Value of Information.” 
60 Richard Yetter Chappell, “Overriding Virtue,” in Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues, ed. Hilary Greaves and 
Theron Pummer (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
61 Gabriel and McElwee, “Effective Altruism, Global Poverty, and Systemic Change.” 





3.1 The Rationality Criticisms 
 Another venerable criticism of utilitarianism recorded by the Catholic Encyclopedia is 
that it would require moral agents to “calculate…all the results of every action” which would 
“require an intellect much more powerful than that with which man is endowed.”62 Here again, 
there are reasons to be doubtful. First, as Mill notes, one can rely on the world’s regularities 
(which are precisely what Effective Altruists use the scientific method to discern) to derive 
heuristic subordinate principles.63 The production of these heuristic subordinate principles 
needed to compensate for each agent’s limited calculation ability is the basic justification for the 
practical side of the Effective Altruism program.64 This procedure should be familiar to 
Thomists,65 who take the natural law to include a multitude of secondary precepts derived from 
the first precept to do good and avoid evil,66 even though fallen humans often fail to understand 
the derivation.67 Second, pace Robert George,68 Thomists also face the calculation problem, 
since as argued above they endorse effectiveness as a matter of precept in at least some cases.69 
Finally, Effective Altruists have taken on the calculation problem directly, calculating the likely 
cost-effectiveness of further research on cost-effectiveness.70 As long as this series of estimates 
converges, the subordinate heuristic principles used by Effective Altruists will be maximally 
efficient. 
                                                 
62 Fox, “Utilitarianism.” 
63 Mill, “Utilitarianism,” 225. 
64 “Our Criteria for Top Charities,” GiveWell, January 2020, https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/criteria. 
65 Mill himself argues for this parallel: “Utilitarianism,” 224. 
66 Aquinas, “ST Ia-IIae” Q. 94, art. 2. 
67 Ibid. Q. 94, art. 6. 
68 Robert P. George, “Does the Incommensurability Thesis Imperil Common Sense Moral Judgements,” Am. J. 
Juris. 37 (1992): 185. 
69 In addition to the case of almsgiving discussed above, the proportionality condition on violence (Aquinas, “ST 
IIa-IIae” Q. 64, art. 7) also requires calculation. . 
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 The calculation criticism can be understood as a special case of the more general 
demandingness objection, that utilitarianism simply asks too much of us, both intellectually and 
morally. The moral over-demandingness of utilitarianism is supposed to consist in its insistence 
that we “promote the happiness of others, even at the expense of our own projects.”71 This 
demandingness should not discomfit Thomists, however, since Aquinas also offers a demanding 
morality where every action is concretely good or evil (never indifferent),72 a good action must 
be good in all respects (species, circumstance, and intention),73 intention is only good insofar as 
it is in complete conformity with the divine will,74 even a disorder of the means implies venial 
sin,75 and ignorance only completely excuses when it is completely involuntary.76 In both moral 
systems the good is jealous and tends to preclude personal projects conceived without reference 
to it. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Thomist and Effective Altruist responses to the 
demandingness objection look quite similar. The first move is to sharply distinguish precept from 
counsel, as when Aquinas insists that almsgiving is only a matter of precept for resources surplus 
to maintaining one’s state in life,77 or as MacAskill puts it, Effective Altruism does not 
normatively imply sacrifice.78 The second move is to nonetheless hold out giving even more as 
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an important exercise of virtue, as in Aquinas’s discussion of liberality,79 or as Richard Yetter 
Chappell puts it for Effective Altruists, “abstract benevolence.”80 
 Alice Crary claims that the form of the demandingness criticism with the most force 
against Effective Altruism is not that it ignores the finitude of our calculative abilities, or the 
finitude of our willpower, but rather that it ignores the finitude of our ability to recognize 
values.81 Recognizing values, she claims, is not merely a matter of abstract intellection, but of 
transformative engagement with the world: service-learning, as it were. In this view, 
commitment to a certain strategy is a transformative experience which may foreclose not only 
factual knowledge that would be gained from other strategies (as Effective Altruists admit),82 but 
even the values that would make such factual effectiveness worth pursuing. Effective Altruists 
admit the basic difficulty, since “devoting a certain proportion of one’s resources to charity is a 
way of life,”83 but contend that their combined commitments to altruism and effectiveness 
provide sufficient resources to craft an answer. Due to altruism, everyone’s preferences should 
count equally (rather than preferring one’s own current or future values), and the scientific 
methodology of effectiveness applies just as well to discovering preferences as to discovering 
facts, so there is no special problem.84 Crary’s rejoinder is that studying social phenomena 
presumes rather than elucidates values: “gender-based and racist abuses are not as such 
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indifferently open to view” but rather “only come into focus through the lens of a sense of the 
social suffering that systematic sexist and racist bias occasions,” so “distinctive methods” rather 
than generalized science are required for ethical engagement with social phenomena.85 Thomists 
also face the transformative experience objection because the virtue of liberality achieves its 
height in giving away all of one’s possessions in order to enter religious life,86 a sharply differing 
state which cannot be fully appreciated in advance.87 The Thomist solution relies not on 
scientific methodology, however, but rather on the tradition which affirms entrance into the 
religious state as a perpetual divine counsel of perfection.88 Avid readers of Catholic philosophy 
will recognize here Alasdair MacIntyre’s incommensurable dialectic of “Encyclopaedia, 
Genealogy, and Tradition.”89 The transformative experience criticism thus cannot be fully 
internalized by Effective Altruists, but nor should it give them pause since it comes from an 
incommensurable view of the world.90 While Thomists may not grant the extreme generality 
Effective Altruists claim for the scientific method, however, they have their own philosophical 
and theological justifications for almsgiving and have no reason to doubt scientific evidence of 
effectiveness within that scope. 
3.2 The Pauline Principle 
 None of the criticisms so far discussed, however, are the reason that utilitarianism 
suffered papal condemnation. John Paul II’s concern was rather that utilitarianism judged the 
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morality of acts purely based on their consequences91 (which for Thomists are merely part of the 
circumstances)92 rather than including their proper objects which sort actions into species.93 For 
utilitarians it is thus “never possible to formulate an absolute prohibition of particular kinds of 
behavior,”94 vitiating the Pauline Principle that evils may never be done for the sake of greater 
goods (see Rom 3:8) central to a Thomistic understanding of ethics.95 Mill tries to brush the 
difficulty aside, arguing that supposed intrinsically evil acts always have evil consequences in a 
suitably general and long-term meta-analysis.96 Nonetheless Mill recognizes that philosophers 
will be able to generate counter-examples to this thesis, so he parries by suggesting that 
alternative ethical theories also fail to uphold truly exception-less moral norms, for which he 
takes truth-telling as his example.97 The problem with Mill’s argument is that it equivocates 
between lying and truth-telling. Aquinas genuinely upholds an exception-less negative moral 
precept against lying,98 but denies that there is any exception-less positive precept to tell the 
truth,99 or indeed that there could be any exception-less positive precepts at all.100 Mill may thus 
be correct that utility (or at least efficiency more broadly) is useful in deciding among conflicting 
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positive norms, but wrong that it can ground all of morality to include exception-less negative 
precepts. 
 As discussed in the axiology section above, however, Effective Altruism is not 
committed to utilitarianism, and in fact MacAskill defines it as compatible with exception-less 
negative precepts, which he calls “side constraints.”101 The problem is that unlike Thomistic 
ethics which derives both efficiency-maximizing considerations and exception-less negative 
precepts from an underlying virtue theory,102 Effective Altruism must model side constraints 
within its fundamental ethics of maximization.103 Such maximization can either be of preferences 
or of expected value, and MacAskill has tried to fit exception-less moral norms into both 
systems. In preference-rankings MacAskill models actions which violate side-constraints as 
least-preferred,104 but this suggests such actions have some relation to the end sought, which 
Aquinas denies.105 Actions which violate negative precepts are not just dis-preferred for 
Aquinas—they constitute genuine practical irrationality since in contradicting charity they lead 
the agents further away from what they most truly desire,106 and true moral dilemmas which 
force agents into such violations are impossible.107 In expected-value maximization, by contrast, 
MacAskill and Ord model actions which violate side-constraints as yielding infinite disvalue.108 
The problem with this model is that it shifts from a (first-person) exception-lessly-prohibited 
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action to a (third-person) exceptionally disvalued world,109 where all relevant worlds are likely to 
have histories involving the violation of putative side constraints. True moral dilemmas are thus 
assumed to exist110 unless the problem is reframed such that the number of norm-violations is 
what matters111—but then of course the negative precepts in question aren’t true “side 
constraints” at all. While MacAskill can gerrymander consequentialist axiology to extend an 
olive branch to non-consequentialists, in the end Effective Altruists can never losslessly model 
Thomistic action theory. For present practical collaborations this is a minor issue because current 
Effective Altruist priorities like assistance to the world’s poorest, improved conditions for 
factory-farmed animals, and artificial intelligence research do not obviously involve the violation 
of any exception-less negative Thomistic moral precepts, which are few.  
4. Aggregation: An Unsolved Combined Problem 
 While Thomists and Effective Altruists have deep yet subtle differences in their 
axiologies and action theories, these are often of minor practical importance. Another long-
standing Thomistic criticism of utilitarianism portends greater practical difficulties for 
collaborating with Effective Altruists today, however—the problem of aggregating utilities. This 
practice of aggregation is driven by both axiological concerns of altruistic impartiality and by the 
need of consequentialist action theory to rank-order possible outcome states of affairs. Mill 
claims as a “proof” of utilitarian ethics “that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is 
a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all 
persons.”112 While the old Catholic Encyclopedia was certainly correct to harshly criticize the 
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logic of this “proof,”113 our present concern is not with the justification of the conclusion but 
rather its appropriateness as a guide to action. The problem from the Thomist perspective is that 
happiness is the achievement of an end rather than the possession of a quantity (of whatever 
kind), so human happiness cannot simply be aggregated like human mass. Rather, the general 
happiness must be a common good shared in by all without division114—the end of a society 
rather than a mere aggregate. Human society, in turn, is according to Aquinas an ordered 
multitude, with a single form inhering in each of its citizen-parts.115 The extrinsic common good 
of the community is God,116 while its intrinsic common good is the perfection of its form,117 
namely the relation of the parts by power in a certain order of dependence,118 yielding a certain 
natural inequality.119 Thus the idea that the common good is a mere aggregate of individual 
happiness seems as absurd to Thomists as the idea that the good of an organism is a mere 
aggregate of the goods of its organs.120 The achievement of individual goods is presupposed by 
the existence of a common good,121 but they cannot constitute its intensive perfection.122 
 As discussed in the response to the hedonic criticism, Effective Altruism is not 
committed to a particular quantitative axiology like Mill’s utilitarianism. If the goal is only to 
help the neediest at current margins and within side constraints (as stressed by MacAskill), then 
Quality-Adjusted-Life-Years or some similar purely instrumental metric can be adopted to assess 
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effectiveness with little objection from Thomists. If Effective Altruism deepens its political 
involvement in response to the institutions criticism, however, its effectiveness metrics must 
relate to justice in a correspondingly broad way that supports counterfactual comparisons to 
increasingly distant possibilities. MacAskill suggests that the method of comparison should be 
impartial welfarism, according to which “for any two worlds A and B with all and only the same 
individuals, of finite number, if there is a one-to-one mapping of individuals from A to B such 
that every individual in A has the same wellbeing as their counterpart in B, then A and B are 
equally good.”123 This criterion ensures that effectiveness metrics respect altruism, but at the cost 
of demanding a quantitative axiology without which “the same wellbeing” is uninterpretable.  
 A forthcoming paper by Jacob Nebel seems to show Effective Altruists a way out.124 
Nebel defends Harsanyi’s Theorem, which guarantees an aggregative expression of the common 
good, so long as both individual and common goods rank possible states of affairs in a partial 
ordering and a possible state of affairs ranked more highly with respect to each individual’s good 
also ranks more highly for the common good—even if comparing individual goods is impossible. 
The trick is performed by treating each individual good’s contribution to the common good as 
weighted by a dimensional constant (in much the same way that a university’s endowment can 
be a function of its age and selectivity without implying that age and selectivity are directly 
comparable in any scale). These dimensional constants have to come from somewhere though, 
and in Nebel’s account they arise from quantitative ranking of possible states of affairs with 
respect to each individual’s good. If this were possible, however, Thomists would not have had 
such good reason to reject Mill’s original account. Effective Altruists must therefore settle for 
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Harsanyi’s own version, in which the weights are selected by evaluative comparisons. If these 
evaluative comparisons are not to presume direct inter-personal comparisons, they must be made 
by weighting the importance of each individual’s good by their contribution to the common 
good, as Aquinas does in his discussion of almsgiving.125 This violates the impartiality of 
MacAskill’s altruism, however, because it entails that exchanging two individuals’ goods does 
not preserve the same level of common good.  
 Thomists can thus endorse effectiveness and altruism only in narrow contexts where the 
common good is not directly at stake rather than in their full generality. If Thomists are trying to 
decide among different charities focusing on health interventions among those in foreign 
countries experiencing extreme poverty, this is a plausible assumption and partnership with 
Effective Altruists is likely to be helpful: the order of society is unlikely to depend on whether a 
child in one country is treated for a disease or a child in another country is educated against 
contracting the disease in the first place. Thomists trying to decide which products to avoid in 
order to reduce animal cruelty in factory farms are likely in a similar situation. The space for 
collaboration between Thomists and Effective Altruists is thus quite broad, though rather less 
than the entire “domain of beneficience” hoped for by the latter126 since there are cases of 
supererogatory liberality which do directly implicate the common good (like Mark Zuckerberg 
and Priscilla Chan’s election administration grants,127 or on a more mundane level the decision to 
check the Presidential Election Campaign Fund on one’s U.S. tax return). Such cases directly 
concern the power relationships within the political unity of order. 
                                                 
125 Aquinas, “ST IIa-IIae” Q. 32, art. 6, co. 
126 Chappell, “Overriding Virtue,” 218. 
127 Kenneth P. Vogel, “Short of Money to Run Elections, Local Authorities Turn to Private Funds,” The New York 
Times, September 25, 2020, sec. U.S. 






 Thomists should commend Effective Altruists for developing utilitarian consequentialism 
in a direction open to broader axiological and action-theoretic concerns without losing its zeal for 
the poor and suffering. The achievements of William MacAskill and others in formulating the 
strictures of effectiveness and altruism in a more neutral way allow collaboration on a broad 
range of humanitarian causes to a degree that would be impossible with pure act utilitarians like 
Peter Singer. Such collaboration not only enables greater economies of scale in relief work, but 
exposes Catholics to a transparent and demanding moral ethic likely to improve their institutions 
and moral character. Nonetheless, Effective Altruism’s increasing political involvement (while 
an internally commendable and consistent response to criticism), should concern Thomists due to 
the increased likelihood of violating exception-less negative precepts and greater conflict 
between merely aggregative estimates of moral value and the true common goods of political 
communities. Thomists should be data-driven egalitarian consequentialists within a certain 
restricted scope, but that scope is itself defined by a more fundamental virtue ethics. 
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